Across the UK, US and parts of Europe we're seeing the same pattern: governments tighten controls in response to protests, geopolitical spillover or online tension and then they don't fully loosen them again. Powers that used to be "just for now" are staying in play. It's not dramatic enough to call it authoritarian, but it is a clear shift from temporary to sustained. For security, assistance and insurance, that's a risk signal.
The UK is a good example, but the logic travels. Recent public-order laws and policing practice make it easier to limit, condition or charge for protest, and to act earlier if something is judged likely to become disruptive. In the past, that sort of posture followed a big trigger and then faded. Now it looks more like the new normal. You can see similar instincts in the US around campus protests and "misinformation" in several European capitals after large pro-Palestine or far-right demonstrations. The justification is usually the same: security, cohesion, foreign influence.
Why does this matter to our sector? Because a higher, longer posture creates more friction for ordinary activity. A media crew, NGO staff or business traveller working near a politically sensitive event now has a greater chance of encountering police-managed disruption, even if nothing violent has happened. For assistance providers, that could mean more of the awkward, grey-zone callouts, short detentions, access blocked, "come back later" in places we used to treat as low-risk. For insurers, it raises the likelihood of civil commotion or denial-of-access clauses being tested in the West.
There is also a narrative layer. Authorities are becoming more willing to say an activity is risky not because it is violent, but because it could inflame tensions or spread information. That's a broad threshold. At the same time, trust in institutions that used to stabilise the information space, even broadcasters like the BBC in the UK, is being challenged from multiple sides. Whether those criticisms are fair matters less than the effect: if the information space is seen as contested, information itself becomes a flashpoint.
As Orwell warned, once truth is contested, those who speak it attract pressure. In practice, that means the speaker, a journalist, activist or corporate representative can become the operational risk, and that's something policy wording doesn't always anticipate.
The takeaway isn't that the UK/US is unsafe now. It's simpler: stop assuming authorities will drop back to a lighter touch after every flare-up. Build domestic political risk into pre-travel briefs, be clearer in wording about politically triggered disruption, and expect more low-level authority contact even in mature markets. If London and Washington keep emergency settings close to "on" other European capitals are likely to follow and we should plan on that basis.
